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Great Recession Years 
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Abstract. This study adopts state-level data to empirically investigate the Tiebout 
hypothesis (as extended by Tullock) of “voting with one’s feet” for the period referred to 
in the U.S. as the “Great Recession” (2007-2009).  As compared to previous studies, we 
use more recent data and provide estimates for three time periods:  the “Great Recession” 
(from July 1, 2007 through June 30, 2009), the pre-Great Recession period (July 1, 2004 
through June 30, 2006) and the post-Great Recession period (July 1, 2009 through June 
30, 2011).  This analysis also differs from most previous literature by including a separate 
cost of living variable and a variable measuring effective state personal income tax rates. 
After allowing for various economic factors and quality of life/climate variables, 
migrants (consumer-voters) over the 2007-2009 period appear to prefer states with lower 
effective state personal income tax rates and higher levels of “fiscal surplus,” defined in 
this study for each state as the total outlay per pupil on primary and secondary public 
education minus the per capita property tax level. The three empirical estimates all 
demonstrate that the Tiebout/Tullock hypothesis was operational not only during but also 
both before and after the Great Recession since for all three time periods migrants 
(consumer-voters) manifested a preference for lower effective state personal income tax 
rates and higher levels of fiscal surplus.     
 
JEL Classifications:  D72, H71, H72 
 
Keywords: total in-migration; effective state income tax rates; fiscal surplus  
 
Introduction 
 
Determinants of human migration, especially within the U.S. but elsewhere as well, have 
been and continue to be a topic of research interest (Renas, 1983; Vedder, et al, 1986; 
Percy, Hawkins, & Maier, 1995; Carrington, Detragiache, and Vishwanath, 1996; Saltz, 
1998; Nechyba, 2000; Conway & Houtenville, 2001, 2003; Rhode & Strumpf, 2003; Chi 
& Voss, 2005; Partridge & Rickman, 2006; Francis, 2007; Ashby, 2007; Landry, et al., 
2007; Fu & Gabriel, 2012; Peters, 2012; Plantinga, et al., 2013). The nature of issues 
considered within the context of internal migration determinants is extremely diverse; 
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indeed, it has (naturally) become increasingly diverse over time as a consequence of 
increasingly more complex research by multiple researchers and in a variety of 
disciplines over time. One of the areas receiving the greatest attention involves the so-
called Tiebout (1956) hypothesis (Cebula, 1978; Renas, 1980; Cebula, 1990; Rhode & 
Strumpf, 2003; Cebula & Alexander, 2006; Banzhaf & Walsh, 2008), also sometimes 
referred to as the Tiebout (1956)-Tullock (1971) hypothesis.  
According to Tiebout (1956, p. 418), “…the consumer-voter may be viewed as 
picking that community which best satisfies his preferences for public goods…the 
consumer-voter moves to that community whose local government best satisfies his set of 
preferences.” As Tullock (1971, p. 917) further observes, this hypothesis can effectively 
be extended such that it holds that, ceteris paribus, the “…individual deciding where to 
live will take into account the private effects upon himself of the bundle of government 
services and taxes…” Thus, Tullock (1971) more explicitly than Tiebout (1956) 
emphasizes that the consumer-voter evaluates both the government goods and services 
and the tax burden at the relevant locations of choice.  
Most studies on the impact of public policy on migration in the U.S. have 
effectively involved migration prior to the Great Recession, which is identified by the 
NBER as the period between December of 2007 and the end of June of 2009. A modest 
number of recently published studies have addressed the economic response of regions to 
a major recession (Connaughton & Madsen, 2012; Hassink, 2010; Martin, 2012; Walden, 
2012).  
Hassink (2010) studies the linkage of regional economic resilience to regional 
economic adaptability under major recessionary circumstances, whereas Martin (2012) 
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further develops the idea of regional economic resilience and investigates its usefulness, 
especially when combined with the notion of hysteresis, in understanding the response of 
regional economies to a major recessionary shock or (simply major recessions) in the 
U.K.  
Connaughton & Madsen (2012) identify states in the US that suffered the greatest 
job losses and those that experienced the least job losses during the Great Recession. 
They find large differences between states in terms of the negative consequences (job 
losses and higher unemployment rates) from the Great Recession. Connaughton & 
Madsen (2012) also find that the industrial composition within each state contributed to 
its economic resilience to and its adaptability to the shock of the Great Recession and 
hence to the magnitude of job losses and to the extent that unemployment rates were 
elevated. Walden (2012) finds preliminary evidence that in a large percentage of cases 
during Great Recession in the U.S., migrants who moved into states with lower 
unemployment rates were themselves unemployed; hence, they were more strongly 
motivated by the need to find employment and secure an income than they were to seek 
lower state and local tax burdens and higher public school outlays per se. Thus, Walden 
(2012) raises the idea that the motivations underlying state in-migration during the Great 
Recession were rather different from those prior to the Great Recession and that the 
linkage between migration and public policy may have been weakened by the economic 
experience of the Great Recession. Although an interesting idea, the ad hoc model and 
empirical evidence regarding this proposition in his single OLS estimate are limited, 
leaving the issue open for further investigation.  
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Interestingly, the Tiebout (1956)/Tullock (1971) hypothesis has not been 
empirically studied for the U.S. for the period of the Great Recession and the years 
immediately prior to and following the Great Recession. Accordingly, the present study 
seeks to help fill this void by empirically investigating this hypothesis using 
contemporary state-level data for the U.S. Conducting this study also provides an 
opportunity to investigate empirically the preliminary hypothesis by Walden (2012) as 
summarized above.   
The present empirical study first addresses the determinants of the state-level total 
in-migration rate during the Great Recession (2007-2009).  During this period it is 
estimated that approximately 14,136,246 persons in the U.S. moved their principal 
residence from one state to another. “The total state in-migration rate” for each time 
period studied is defined in this study as the ratio of the total number of domestic 
migrants moving into each given state from all of the remaining 49 states during a given 
study period relative to the beginning-of-period total population in each state. This study 
seeks to shed light on whether fiscal factors such as outlays per pupil on public primary 
and secondary education, per capita property tax liabilities, and state personal income tax 
rates influenced consumer-voters’ mobility decisions during this Great Recession study 
period. In addition, this study seeks to demonstrate whether these same factors, i.e., 
outlays per pupil on public primary and secondary education, per capita property tax 
burdens, and state personal income tax rates, influenced state total in-migration rates in 
the pre-Great Recession (2004-2006) and post-Great Recession years (2009-2011).1 
                                                          
1During the pre-Great Recession period (2004-2006), it is estimated that approximately 
14,999,128 persons in the U.S. moved their residence from one state to another; the 
corresponding figure for the post-Great Recession period (2009-2011) was 13,730,645 
persons. 
  5 
Thus, three sets of empirical findings are provided, each with the same explanatory 
variables, although reflecting values for different years, depending upon the study period. 
We use lagged values of explanatory variables in all estimates to address issues of 
potential endogeniety.  
Numerous previous studies have empirically addressed determinants of internal 
migration within the United States. A number of these studies emphasize the migration 
impact not only of economic and fiscal factors but also of non-economic factors, 
including “quality-of-life” factors, especially climate (Vedder 1976; Renas, 1978; 1980; 
1983; Clark & Hunter, 1992; Cebula & Belton, 1994; Saltz, 1998; Conway & 
Houtenville, 1998, 2001, 2003; Gale & Heath, 2000; Milligan, 2000; Davies, Greenwood, 
& Li, 2001; Cebula & Alexander, 2006). As demonstrated in these studies, the omission 
of non-economic factors, especially climate-reflecting variables, from an empirical 
migration analysis constitutes an omitted-variable problem that generally compromises 
the integrity of that analysis. As a consequence, this empirical study will include not only 
fiscal factors and economic factors but also purely quality-of-life factors.  
 
The Basic Migration Decision Framework 
We follow the economic path of most migration studies in the U.S. since the 
contributions by Sjaastad (1962) and Riew (1973), among others, and treat the consumer-
voter’s overall migration decision as an investment decision such that the decision to 
migrate from area i to area j requires that his/her expected net discounted present value of 
migration from area i to area j, DPVij, be both (a) positive and (b) the maximum net 
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discounted present value that can be expected from moving from area i to any other 
known and plausible alternative area.  
 Following in principle the models in Tiebout, (1956), Sjaastad (1962), Tullock 
(1971), Riew (1973), Vedder (1976), Cebula (1978), Renas (1983), Vedder, Gallaway, 
Graves, & Sexton (1986), and Cebula & Alexander (2006), among others, DPVij consists 
in this study of three broad sets of considerations, namely: 
1. Economic conditions in those areas;  
2. Fiscal factors in those areas; and  
3. Environmental characteristics of the areas. 
According to this investment framework, it follows that migration will flow from area i to 
area j only if: 
DPVij  > 0; DPVij = MAX for j, where j = 1,2,…,z       (1) 
where z represents all of the plausible known alternative locations to area i. Given the 
focus in this study on state migration, area j is actually state j. Clearly, although the 
framework is an investment model, either a carefully crafted constrained-utility 
maximization model or a carefully constructed cost-benefit model (Cebula, 1978) could 
have been adopted and used to introduce the same categories of variables. 
The total state in-migration rate for the Great Recession, MIGj, is the total number 
of domestic in-migrants to state j over the period July, 1, 2007-June 30, 2009, expressed 
as a percent of the year 2007 population in state j. This specification in percentage terms 
allows comparisons of each state’s total in-migration rate with those of the other states. 
The only available data on state total in-migration in the U.S. follow this July 1st  to June 
30th  time frame pattern; thus, for roughly the first five months of the Great Recession 
  7 
study period, the economy was not officially/technically in recession, although it was 
materially slowing down prior to December, 2007 (Council of Economic Advisors, 2009, 
Table B-2).  
We use three variables to measure the economic conditions in state j. The first of 
these purely economic variables is the per capita personal income in state j, 
PCPERSINCj. Conventional wisdom suggests that the higher the per capita personal 
income in a state, the higher the expected income in that state and hence the more 
appealing it would be to move to that state. Thus, MIGj, the total domestic in-migration 
rate to state j is hypothesized to be an increasing function of PCPERSINCj, ceteris 
paribus. This variable constitutes an average measure of expected income/wage prospects 
in state j if one were to actually have a job in that state.    
The second purely economic variable included in the model is the percentage 
unemployment rate in state j, URj, which is the average unemployment rate of the civilian 
labor force over the course of the year in state j. The higher the unemployment rate in a 
state, the less promising are the job prospects in the state and hence the less appealing 
that state is as a place of residence (Riew, 1973; Sommers & Suits, 1973; Cebula, 1979; 
Walden, 2012). Clearly, then, the total domestic in-migration rate to state j is expected to 
be a decreasing function of URj, ceteris paribus.  
The third purely economic variable is COSTj, the overall cost of living in state j 
for the average four-person family, expressed as an index, with COSTj = 100.00 being the 
theoretical mean value of this indexed variable. In the absence of money illusion, the total 
domestic in-migration rate to state j is hypothesized to be a decreasing function of 
COSTj, ceteris paribus, because the higher the cost of living, the lower one’s real income 
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and the lower one’s standard of living. The adoption of a variable such as COSTj in 
migration studies is becoming more common (Renas, 1978, 1980, 1983; Cebula, 1979; 
Conway & Houtenville, 1998, 2001, 2003; Gale & Heath 2000; Cebula & Alexander, 
2006).  
We adopt three variables to measure fiscal factors, although two of them are 
eventually merged into one to avoid multi-collinearity. The first fiscal factor variable 
considered in this study is AVSTINCTRj, the average effective percentage state personal 
income tax rate in state j. This variable is the average state personal income tax paid by 
residents of state j, expressed as a percentage of the average family income in state j. 
Such a variable has usually been overlooked in studies of a Tiebout-type framework, 
although it has been considered on a limited basis, i.e., by a few studies (Cebula, 1990; 
Conway & Houtenville, 2001; Cebula & Alexander, 2006). It is hypothesized here that 
the total domestic in-migration rate to state j is a deceasing function of AVSTINCTRj, 
ceteris paribus (Tullock, 1971) because a higher effective state personal income tax 
implies a lower disposable income. Since nine states do not have a state income tax, for 
these states, the value of AVSTINCTRj = 0. The nine states in question are Alaska, 
Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and 
Wyoming. 
The variable PCPROPTXj is defined as the total local (city plus county) per capita 
nominal property tax liability on residential property in state j. Such a variable has often 
been considered in studies of a Tiebout-type framework (Pack, 1973; Barsby & Cox, 
1975; Greene, 1977; Liu, 1977; Renas, 1980; Conway & Houtenville, 1998, 2001; Gale 
& Heath, 2000; Rhode & Strumpf, 2003; Cebula & Alexander, 2006). It is expected that 
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the total domestic in-migration rate to state j is a decreasing function of PCPROPTXj, 
ceteris paribus, because a higher property tax burden implies a lower disposable income. 
The principal outlay financed by property taxes is of course public primary and 
secondary education. Continuing, the variable ANNUALPERPUPj is the nominal outlay 
in state j per pupil on primary and secondary public education from all sources, federal, 
state, and local. The variable ANNUALPERPUPj is be distinguished from the very 
commonly adopted variable per capita public education outlays found in many previous 
studies (Pack, 1973; Greene, 1977; Hinze, 1977; Cebula, 1979; Renas, 1980; Conway & 
Houtenville, 1998, 2001; Gale & Heath, 2000; Rhode& Strumpf, 2003). Indeed, it is 
stressed in this study, as hypothesized in a prior study by Cebula & Alexander (2006), 
that higher per pupil outlays on public education are a more direct measure of a 
commitment to better quality education than higher per capita outlays on public 
education. In any event, it is hypothesized here that, ceteris paribus, the total domestic in-
migration rate to state j is an increasing function of ANNUALPERPUPj because a greater 
outlay on public education per pupil arguably implies a greater commitment to the 
pursuit of a better quality public education system in the state, as well as a reduced 
inclination or perceived need to choose private education (with its accompanying 
pecuniary costs, especially tuition) over public education. 
 Not surprisingly, the variables PCPROPTXj and ANNUALPERPUPj are highly 
correlated (r = 0.63). Accordingly, we construct a “fiscal surplus” variable labelled 
FISCSURPj, which is the value of ANNUALPERPUPj minus the value of PCPROPTXj. 
The variable FISCSURPj is a measure of the average excess of the value received from 
per pupil outlays on primary and secondary public education in state j minus the per 
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capita property tax associated with paying most of those outlays in state j. According to 
Tiebout (1956) and Tullock (1971), as well as Buchanan (1950), the consumer-voter 
seeks to maximize fiscal surplus. Thus, it is hypothesized in this study that the total 
domestic in-migration rate to state j is an increasing function of FISCSURPj, ceteris 
paribus. 
Finally, there are three quality-of-life variables included in the model. Two of 
these are climatic in nature. The first of these climatic variables is JANTEMPj, defined 
here as the mean January temperature in state j (1971-2000), as a measure of warmer 
climatic conditions. As in so many migration studies (Renas, 1978; 1980; 1983; Clark & 
Hunter, 1992; Cebula & Belton, 1994; Saltz, 1998; Conway & Houtenville, 1998, 2001, 
2003; Gale & Heath, 2000; Milligan, 2000; Davies, Greenwood, & Li, 2001; Cebula & 
Alexander, 2006), this variable is treated as a quality-of-life control variable. As is 
typically the case in these studies, it is hypothesized that a warmer climate is likely to 
increase the inflow of migrants as a reflection of their typical preference for warmer 
weather, especially during the winter months. Thus, it is hypothesized that the total 
domestic in-migration rate to state j is an increasing function of JANTEMPj, ceteris 
paribus. 
As a supplemental measure of climate, one which arguably reflects elevated 
summer-time heat and elevated humidity, the model includes the variable CDDj, the 
average annual number of cooling degree days in state j (1971-2000). In this case, the 
focus is upon the discomfort typically associated with climates having much higher 
summer temperatures and higher humidity. Given that a higher number of annual cooling 
degree days reflects conditions of greater summer heat and humidity, it is hypothesized, 
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given presumed migrant preferences for (higher valuation of) physical comfort (Cebula & 
Vedder, 1973; Renas, 1978; 1983; Clark & Hunter, 1992; Saltz, 1998), that the total 
domestic in-migration rate to state j is a deceasing function of CDDj, ceteris paribus. 
The third and final expressly quality-of-life variable is population density, 
POPDENj, defined as the number of people per square mile in state j. Arguably, greater 
population density per se can be associated with greater roadway congestion, greater 
congestion on public transit facilities, and in the general conduct of life, such as more 
crowded grocery stores, theatres, restaurants, shopping malls, and the like. To the extent 
that such congestion and crowding adds travel-time to work or other destinations or 
simply creates discomfort in the form of waiting lines and delays, it follows that greater 
population density would act as a deterrent to in-migration (Cebula & Vedder, 1973; 
Cebula, 1979; Renas, 1978; 1983; Saltz, 1998). Hence, it is hypothesized that the total 
domestic in-migration rate to state j is a decreasing function of POPDENj, ceteris 
paribus.   
 
The Initial Estimate: The Great Recession Years, 2007-2009 
The reduced-form equation initially to be estimated is given by (2): 
MIGj2007-2009 = a0 + a1 PCPERSINCj2005 + a2 URj2006 + a3 COSTj2006  
+ a4 AVSTINCTRj2005 + a5 FISCSURPj 2005 + a6 JANTEMPj1971-2000 
+ a7 CDDj1971-2000 + a8 POPDENj2005 + u     (2) 
where a0 = constant term and u = stochastic error term. The time period following each 
variable in equation (2) indicates the adoption of the value of that variable during the 
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specified time period. As noted earlier, the explanatory variables are lagged to avoid 
potential endogeneity problems.  
The study includes all 50 states but excludes Washington, D.C. as an outlier; 
indeed, its inclusion altered the results for several variables. Moreover, it can be argued 
as a legitimate omission since it is in fact not a state. In fact, inclusion of Washington, 
D.C. could well raise the question of whether Puerto Rico should have been included in 
the study. Finally, omission of Washington, D.C. is consistent with most previous 
migration studies of the U.S. 
  The data source for the variable MIGj was the U.S. Census Bureau (2012, Table 
33; 2011, Table 33). The source for variable PCPERSINCj, was the U.S. Census Bureau 
(2010, Table 665), while the data source for variable COSTj was the Council for 
Community and Economic Research (2013). The data source for variable URj was the 
U.S. Census Bureau (2009, Table 609). The source for variable JANTEMPj was the U.S. 
Census Bureau (2010, Table 378), whereas the data source for variable CDDj was the 
U.S. Bureau of the Census (2010, Table 384) and that for POPDENj was U.S. Census 
Bureau (2012, Table 14). The data for the policy variables AVSTINCTRj, PCPROPTXj, 
and ANNUALPERPUP were obtained to compute FISCSURPj from the U.S. Census 
Bureau (2010, Table 13) and U.S. Census Bureau (2012, Table 555; 2010, Table 242); 
the latter two variables are used to construct the fiscal surplus variable, FISCSURPj. For 
the convenience of the reader, the full definitions of all the variables in this analysis are 
provided in the Appendix. For the interested reader, descriptive statistics in the forms of 
means, standard deviations, maximum values, and minimum values are provided in Table 
1. 
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Based on the arguments provided above and the “conventional wisdom” as 
expressed by Tiebout (1956), Tullock (1971), and Riew (1973), and more recently by 
Conway & Houtenville (2001) and Cebula & Alexander (2006), among others, the 
following coefficient signs (each case assumes ceteris paribus) are hypothesized: 
a1 > 0, a2 < 0, a3 < 0, a4 < 0, a5 > 0, a6 > 0, a7 < 0, a8 < 0   (3) 
Formal testing for the presence of heteroskedasticity suggests that it is a problem; indeed, 
this problem was found to be present in all three of the estimations in this study. 
Accordingly, the White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction is adopted in all three cases. 
Interestingly, an examination of the correlations among the explanatory variables for 
multi-collinearity reveals that it does not seem to be a problem, given the use of the fiscal 
surplus variable.  
The results of estimating equation (2) by OLS are provided in column (a) of Table 
2. All eight of the estimated coefficients exhibit the expected signs, with three being 
statistically significant at the 1% level and three being statistically significant at the 5% 
level.  The estimated coefficients on two of the explanatory variables, URj (the 
percentage unemployment rate in state j) and CDDj (the average annual number of 
cooling degree days in state j), fail to be statistically significant at the 10% level.2  
 Let us first consider the expressly economic variables. PCPERSINCj, the variable 
that provides a measure for income expectations from residence in state j (the per capita 
personal income in state j) exhibits a coefficient that is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Hence, for the years of the Great Recession, this result 
                                                          
2 The coefficient of determination (R2) is 0.68, whereas the adjusted coefficient of 
determination (adjR2) is 0.62, so that the model explains approximately two-thirds of the 
variation in the dependent variable, MIGj. Finally, the F-statistic is statistically 
significant at the 1% level, attesting to the overall strength of the model. 
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suggests that the total state in-migration rate was positively associated with higher levels 
of per capita personal income in that state, i.e., with higher expected income in that state. 
More specifically, over the 2007–2009 period (i.e., during the Great Recession), a one-
unit increase ($1 in current U.S. dollars)  in a state’s personal income per capita would be 
associated with an increase in that state’s total in-migration rate of 0.0002 or 0.02%. 
Alternatively stated, if a state’s personal income per capita were to increase by $1,000, its 
increased per capita income would in theory be associated with a 20% increase in its total 
in-migration rate, everything else held the same.  
Next, the cost-of-living variable exhibits a negative coefficient that is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Not surprisingly perhaps, given the economic hardships 
imposed by the Great Recession, this result suggests that the total in-migration rate was 
negatively associated with higher cost-of-living levels in that state. As the estimated 
coefficient implies, over this time period, a one-unit increase in a state’s overall cost-of-
living index would be associated with a decrease in the total in-migration rate to that state 
of 0.014, or 1.4%.  
Next, we consider the purely quality-of-life variables. The coefficient on the 
JANTEMPj variable is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level; thus, this 
result suggests, as anticipated, that higher total in-migration rates were positively 
associated with a higher average January temperature, i.e., states with warmer climates 
(Renas, 1983; Clark & Hunter, 1992; Saltz, 1998; Conway & Houtenville, 1998, 2001; 
Gale & Heath, 2000). Thus, during the Great Recession, a one-unit increase in a state’s 
30-year average January temperature, e.g., from the sample average of 32.7 degrees 
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Fahrenheit to 33.7 degrees Fahrenheit, would be associated with an increase in that 
state’s total in-migration rate of 6.9%, everything else constant.  
The estimated coefficient on the population density variable is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. This result suggests that the total in-migration rate 
in this study period was negatively associated with population density. More specifically, 
a rise in the population density of a state by one person per square mile would be 
associated with a reduction in the total in-migration rate to that state of 0.0022, i.e., 
0.22%. Hence, over this study period, a ten-person rise in a state’s population density 
would be associated with a 2.2% reduction the total in-migration rate to that state, other 
things held the same.   The other quality-of-life variable, (CDDj), does not have a 
coefficient statistically significant at even the 10% level. 
 Finally, we focus on the public policy variables. AVSTINCTRj, the average 
effective state personal income tax rate in state j, has a negative coefficient that is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, this result suggests that as hypthesized, 
lower total in-migration rates were associated with higher average effective state personal 
income tax rates. In this case, other things held the same, a one-unit increase in a state’s 
average effective percentage state personal income tax rate, e.g., from 3% to 4%, would 
be associated with a decrease in that state’s total in-migration rate of nearly 36% since 
the coefficient is -0.357. This variable appears to be a potent Tiebout (1956)/Tullock 
(1971)-type variable, implying that state policy-makers should be especially circumspect 
about using this taxing tool as a source of revenue enhancement. 
As for the fiscal surplus variable, FISCSURPj, the estimated coefficient on this 
variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level; hence, this result suggests, 
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as hypothesized, that higher total in-migration rates were positively associated with 
higher levels of fiscal surplus (Tiebout (1956), Tullock (1971); Pack, 1973; Cebula & 
Alexander, 2006). Regarding this variable, a one-unit ($1) increase in a state’s fiscal 
surplus would be associated with an increase in that state’s total in-migration rate equal to 
0.000261 or 0.0261%. Hence, an increase in the fiscal surplus (as defined) in a state equal 
to $100 would be associated with an increase in the total in-migration rate equal to 
2.61%, on average, other things held the same. 
 In sum then, for the Great Recession period 2007-2009, the total state-in-
migration rate was positively associated with per capita personal income, warmer January 
temperatures, and higher levels of fiscal surplus. For the same study period, the total state 
in-migration rate was negatively associated with higher levels of the average overall cost 
of living, the average effective state personal income tax rate, and population density. 
 
  The Pre- and Post-Great Recession Estimates: 2006-2006 and 2009-2011 
We also estimate reduced-form equations (4) and (5), which parallel equation (2), for the 
periods 2004-2006 and 2009-2011 respectively: 
 
MIGj2004-2006 = a0 + a1 PCPERSINCj2003 + a2 URj2003 + a3 COSTj2003  
+ a4 AVSTINCTRj2002+ a5 FISCSURPj2002 + a6 JANTEMPj1971-2000 
+a7 CDDj1971-2000 + a8 POPDENj2000+ u     (4) 
 
MIGj2009-2011 = a0 + a1 PCPERSINCj2008 + a2 URj2007 + a3 COSTj2008  
+ a4 AVSTINCTRj2007 + a5 FISCSURPj2007 + a6 JANTEMPj1971-2000  
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+a7 CDDj1971-2000 + a8 POPDENj2005 + u     (5) 
 
The data source for the variable MIGj2004-2006 was the U.S. Census Bureau (2008, 
Table 33; 2009, Table 32), and the data sources for the variable MIGj2009-2011 were the 
U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey (2010; 2011) and the U.S. Census 
Bureau (2012, Table 19). The remaining data were also obtained from the U.S. Census 
(2001; 2009; 2010, 2011; 2012) and from the Council for Community and Economic 
Research (2013). The White (1980) heteroskedasticity-corrected estimations of equations 
(4) and (5) are provided in columns (b) and (c), respectively, of Table 2.  
In column (b), all eight of the estimated coefficients exhibit the hypothesized 
signs, with four statistically significant at the 1% level, two statistically significant at the 
5% level, one statistically significant at the 10% level (URj) and only one statistically 
insignificant at the 10% level (CDDj).3  
The variable per capita personal income exhibits a coefficient that is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Hence, during the 2004-2006 timeframe, this 
result suggests that the total state in-migration rate was positively associated with higher 
levels of per capita personal income. Next, the cost-of-living variable exhibits a negative 
coefficient that is statistically significant at the 5% level. This result suggests that the 
total state 2004-2006 in-migration rate was negatively associated with higher cost-of-
living levels. Finally, there is weak evidence of an association between the total state in-
migration rate and the unemployment rate for this period at the 10% level of significance.  
                                                          
3 The coefficient of determination (R2) is 0.64, whereas the adjusted coefficient of 
determination is 0.57, so that the model explains approximately three-fifths of the 
variation in the dependent variable, MIGj. Finally, the F-statistic is statistically 
significant at the 1% level, attesting to the overall strength of the model. 
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Among the quality-of-life variables, the coefficient on the warm weather variable, 
JANTEMPj, is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This result suggests 
that higher total in-migration rates were positively associated with a higher average 
January temperature (Renas, 1983; Clark & Hunter, 1992; Saltz, 1998; Conway & 
Houtenville, 1998, 2001; Gale & Heath, 2000). The estimated coefficient on the 
population density variable, POPDENj, is negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level, suggesting a negative association between the 2004-2006 total state in-migration 
rate and population density. CDDj (the average annual number of cooling degree days in 
state j) was not statistically significant even at the 10% level. 
 Finally, we focus on the public policy variables. The coefficient on AVSTINCTRj, 
the average effective state personal income tax rate in state j, is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This result suggests, as hypothesized, that lower total state in-
migration rates were associated with higher average effective state personal income tax 
rates. The coefficient on the fiscal surplus variable, FISCSURPj, is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This result suggests, as expected, that higher total 
state in-migration rates were associated with higher levels of fiscal surplus (Tiebout, 
1956; Tullock, 1971; Pack, 1973; Cebula & Alexander, 2006). 
The results for the period 2009-2011 are very similar to those for the other two 
study periods. Overall, as shown in column (c) of Table 2, all eight coefficients exhibit 
the expected signs, with three statistically significant at the 1% level and four statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Only the coefficient on the CDDj variable fails (again) to be 
statistically significant at the 10% level.  
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In sum, for the 2009-2011 study period, the total state in-migration rate was 
positively associated with per capita personal income, warmer January temperatures, and 
higher levels of fiscal surplus. Furthermore, for this same study period, the total state in-
migration rate was negatively associated with the average overall cost of living, 
population density, the unemployment rate [as suggested by Walden (2012)], and the 
effective state personal income tax rate.  
 
Conclusions  
This empirical study has investigated fiscal, as well as economic and non-economic 
(quality-of-life) determinants of total state in-migration in the U.S. over three time 
periods: the Great Recession period, 2007-2009; a pre-Great Recession time period, 
2004-2006; and a post-Great Recession time period, 2009-2011. The principal intent of 
investigating these three different time periods has been to provide evidence regarding 
whether there continues to be empirical support for the Tiebout (1956)/Tullock (1971) 
hypothesis, be it during, before, or after the Great Recession.  
The findings provided in this study support the Tiebout (1956)/Tullock (1971) 
hypothesis in terms of the contemporary mobility of consumer-voters. For all three of 
these study periods, the model specification has allowed for five purely economic factors, 
three quality of life variables, and two fiscal factors, one of which, FISCSURPj, 
embodies, i.e., is the arithmetic difference between two fiscal factors, the annual per 
pupil outlay on public primary and secondary education minus the per capita property 
tax. For each of the three study periods, it appears that the following is the case: the total 
state in-migration rate was positively associated with per capita personal income, warmer 
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January temperatures, and higher levels of fiscal surplus. In addition, for these same 
study periods, the total state in-migration rate was also negatively associated with the 
average overall cost of living, population density, and the average effective state personal 
income tax rate. The results for both the effective state personal income tax rate variable 
and the fiscal surplus variable imply that the search for “fiscal surplus” appears to be 
ongoing (Buchanan, 1950) and that the search was not effectively altered by the various 
experiences of the Great Recession. 
Moreover, as observed in the above analysis, the average state personal income tax rate  
appears to be a potent Tiebout (1956)/Tullock (1971)-type variable, implying that state 
policy-makers should be especially circumspect about raising this tax rate as a source of 
revenue enhancement, since such a policy could very well have perverse effects on their 
state revenues. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
The purpose of this APPENDIX is to provide a clear and simple definition for each of the 
variables considered in this study. The definition excludes years and focuses on what 
each variable represents. 
 
MIGj = the total state in-migration rate to state j, defined as the total number of in-
migrants to each state (j) over a specified time period divided by the total population of 
each state (j) at the beginning of the study period; this number is converted from a 
decimal to a percent, as is standard in nearly all of the migration literature 
 
PCPERSINCj = the personal income per capita earned in a specified year in each state 
(j); this number is expressed in current dollars 
 
URj = the average unemployment rate of the civilian labor force in each state (j) over the 
course of a specified year; this number is expressed as a percent 
 
COSTj = an index of the overall cost of living for the “average” four-person family 
residing in each state (j) during the course of a given year; this number is expressed as an 
index, with a higher index value indicating a higher overall cost of living  
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AVSTINCTRj = the average effective percentage state personal income tax rate in each 
state (j); this variable is the average state personal income tax paid by residents of each 
state (j) expressed as a percentage of the average family income in each state (j) 
 
PCPROPTXj = the total local (city plus county) property tax liability (in current dollars) 
on residential property per capita in each state (j) 
 
ANNUALPERPUPj = the annual nominal outlay (in current dollars) in each state (j) per 
pupil on primary and secondary public education from all sources, i.e., federal plus state 
plus local 
 
FISCSURPj = ANNUALPERPUPj – PCPROPTXj, the average level of fiscal surplus in 
each state j, i.e., the annual nominal outlay (in current dollars) in each state (j) per pupil 
on primary and secondary public education from all sources, i.e., federal plus state plus 
local, minus the total local (city plus county) property tax liability (in current dollars) on 
residential property per capita in each state (j) 
 
JANTEMPj = the average January temperature in degrees Fahrenheit in each state (j); this 
average was computed over the 30 year period from 1971 through 2000 
 
CDDj = the average annual number of cooling degree days in each state (j); this average 
was computed over the 30 year period from 1971 through 2000 
 
POPDENSj = the average number of people residing in each state (j) per square mile in 
any specified year 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics on Variables, 2007-2009 Estimation 
 
Variable Arithmetic Average Standard Deviation Maximum     Minimum 
MIGj   5.958  2.055   11.9  2.5   
PCPERSINCj  29,951  4,425   43,047  22,092 
COSTj   96.298  17.305   138.2  81.5 
EMPLGRRj  7.291  3.597   19.82  0.749 
AVSTINCTRj  2.898  1.962   7.851  0.00 
FISCSURPj  2,522  3,486   5,005  -1,849   
 
JANTEMPj  32.7  12.65   73.0  10.2 
 
CDDj   1,283.5 984.49   4,561  0.0 
 
POPDENj  188.82  256.45   1,170  1.15 
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Table 2. Empirical Results for Total State In-Migration Rate 
Dependent Variable: MIGj 
 
Study Period   2007-2009 2004-2006 2009-2011 
Variable/Column  (a)  (b)  (c)   
PCPERSINCj   0.0002*** 0.00015** 0.00012***  
    (2.62)  (2.20)  (2.66)   
 
URj    -0.29  -0.417* -0.525** 
    (-1.08)  (-1.88)  (-2.23) 
 
COSTj    -0.014** -0.019** -0.008**  
    (-2.14)  (-2.40)  (-2.09)   
 
AVSTINCTRj   -0.357*** -0.374*** -0.29**  
    (-2.72)  (-3.33)  (-2.60)   
 
FISCSURPj   0.000261*** 0.00024*** 0.00021*** 
    (7.41)  (6.77)  (6.68) 
 
JANTEMPj   0.069** 0.119*** 0.069**  
    (2.53)  (3.78)  (2.61) 
 
CDDj    -0.00055 -0.0009 -0.00055 
    (-1.57)  (-1.63)  (-1.53) 
  
POPDENj   -0.0021** -0026*** -0.0024*** 
  30 
    (-2.17)  (-3.10)  (-2.63) 
 
Constant   1.81  4.34  3.54 
 
n    50  50  50   
R2    0.68  0.64  0.68   
adjR2    0.62  0.57  0.62   
F    10.96*** 9.18*** 10.99***  
 
***statistically significant at 1% level; **statistically significant at 5% level; 
*statistically significant at 10% level. T-values are in parentheses.  
 
